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THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES AND THE
INDIANA PERPETUITIES STATUTE
By W. BARTON LEACH*

I was afflicted with a substantial, but not fatal, touch of diffidence this morning with regard to the matter that I was

dealing with then, and with regard to the matter I am dealing
with now, I am afflicted with a considerable touch of embarrassment.
I am going to talk about the Indiana law of perpetuities.
I come from the outside and am talking to you about something to which you are willy-nilly, closely related.
There may be issues of local pride involved, but my job as
I see it, as an impartial person having a general understanding
of the law of perpetuities at common law, under your statutes
and under other statutes, is to call them as I see them. In
characterizing the Indiana law of perpetuities, I am faced with
this embarrassment: Confidentially, my friends, it is not so
good I
You haven't a great many cases on perpetuities, but such
cases as you have reflect the difficulties which are bound to
arise under the law as it is set up in your statute books. I
*Professor of law, Harvard Law School. This is the second of two lectures
given by Professor Leach at the State Bar Association Institute, held at Indianapolis, January 12, 1940. The subject-matter of the first lecture may be found
in an article by Professor Leach on "Powers of Appointment," 24 A. B. A. JI. S07.
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am not going to say everything that appears in the Indiana
reports that one might term unusual is excused by the form
of the statutes, but a good deal of it is. I hope you won't be
offended. If I can by any chance tread that dizzy edge between
offering criticism that is bound to be somewhat destructive,
and offending the local pride that one feels towards his institutions when discussed by an outsider, it may be that something
will be done to make it possible to avoid the difficulties which
I assure you are going to arise with regard to your Indiana
law even to a greater extent than they have arisen.
And those difficulties are going to be difficulties which in
practically every case is going to thwart some perfectly decent,
rational, reasonable intention of a testator, and cause some
people who ought to be decently provided for by his funds
to suffer the humiliation of being impoverished where they
ought to be affluent, and a public liability from being charges
upon the relief funds.
Something ought to be done and I will now proceed, not
only in that vein, but I will now proceed in that vein and
also, in the vein of suggesting to you as practitioners rather
than legislators, how best to work things out until you have
a better instrument to operate with.
THE RULE AND THE INDIANA STATUTES

Let me urge upon you that in this field you do not satisfy
your professional obligations to your clients by being aware
of the Indiana law, because the rule against perpetuities that
will be applicable to the wills which you draw is determined by
two things:
(a) the nature of the property that is concerned, and
(b) where your testators die, or more exactly, the jurisdiction in
which they are domiciled at the time of their death.

If real estate is involved, the real estate is governed as to
the law of perpetuities by the jurisdiction in which it is located.
If personal property is involved, the rule against perpetuities
of the domicile of the testator at the time of his death governs,
and either of those may or may not be Indiana. Hence, in
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this matter, a general familiarity with perpetuities law not only
under the Indiana statutes, but in other states and under the
common law is of vital necessity to any practitioner. The
common-law rule against perpetuities provides in its classic
statement that
"No interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than 21

years after some life in being at the creation of the interest." 1

That rule against perpetuities exists in all but thirteen of
the states of the United States. It used to exist in all but six,
but of the thirteen dissenting jurisdictions three have since
come back to the common-law rule as I shall point out shortly.
COMMENTS ON THE STATUTES

Now, your Indiana statutes were printed immediately after
the common-law rule. I think I ought to say a word about
2
your Indiana statutes and their origin.
They are plagiarized from the New York Real Property
Law, but apparently there was some literary pride in the
draftsmen of your Indiana statutes, because they didn't take
the whole thing. Since they didn't take the whole thing, the
Indiana statutes as they appear in your books lack a considerable degree of the comprehensibility that they had in
the New York statutes. But they have all of the difficulties
in application which have driven New York lawyers and
judges nearly mad for about a hundred years. Not only are
those sections not taken in toto from the New York Real
Property Code, but also a great many companion sections
which define and modify the statutes in the New York code
have been left out of the Indiana code. That is no help
in making these sections workable. Mind you, the silver lining
of this cloud is that most of the potential difficulties with these
sections have not yet arisen in litigation that has been reported.
The situation can still be saved without great loss to anyone.
But if something isn't done about these statutes, mark my
1 Gray, Perpetuities (3rd ed.), § 201.
2 Burns' Ind. Stat. 1933, §§ 56-142 and 51-101.
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words, they are going to cause some results which are simply
horrifying.
"The absolute power of aliening lands shall not be suspended by any
limitation or condition whatever, contained in any grant, conveyance or
devise, for a longer period than during the existence of a life or any
number of lives in being at the creation of the estate conveyed, granted,
devised and therein specified, with the exception that a contingent
remainder in fee may be created on a prior remainder in fee, to take
effect in the event that the person or persons to whom the first remainder
is limited shall die under the age of 21 years, or upon any other contingency by which the estate of such person or persons may be determined
before they attain their full age."
Now, I say that section was taken from the New York Real
Property Law. When it was taken, three principal changes
were made. In the first place, the definition of suspension of
the power of alienation, which the New York code contains,
was omitted.
So that the Indiana courts, and you as practitioners, have no
aid in determining what suspension of the power of alienation
means. That hasn't caused any difficulty yet, but it is bound
to be a source of litgation in the future. The New York
code provides:
"The absolute power of alienation is suspended when there are no
persons in being by whom an absolute fee in possession can be con..
3
veyed."
That has a meaning.
If there are persons who can get together, and convey a
fee, then you have no suspension of the power of alienation.
That was omitted. What does the omission mean as a matter
of statutory construction? Does it mean that the omission
was intentional and hence the Indiana Legislature meant something different from what the New York Legislature meant?
Well, that would tend to be the inference one might draw,
and if they didn't mean that, what did they mean by suspension of the power of alienation?
3 N. Y. Real Property Law, § 42.
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That is an issue which your court some day will have to
decide if these statutes remain on the books.
The second thing that the Indiana Legislature did in adopting these sections from New York was to change the period
of perpetuities, which in New York is two lives, to any number
of lives. Now, that is all to the good. That two-life rule in
New York has been a nightmare for about a hundred years.
The courts of New York have become very astute in making
two lives grow where three grew before, but even that hasn't
been able to save a great many reasonable dispositions. In
New York where a man has three persons he wants to take
care of, three branches of the family-say, three children and
their children-it is a practical impossibility to do that economically.
Now, you don't have to do it economically if you have five
million dollars. But if you have the kind of an estate that
you or I hope to be able to leave, then those assets have to
be marshalled very, very carefully. This can be done under
the common-law rule, but cannot be done in New York.
So variation number two was all to the good.
Variation number three consists of those words "and therein
specified," which occur in the following clause of the statute:
"Any grant, conveyance or devise, for a longer period than during
the existence of a life or any number of lives in being at the creation
of the estate conveyed, granted, devised, and therein specified."
Does the "therein specified" refer to the estate, or does it
refer to the lives? I don't know and I defy you, authoritatively to state, before your court has determined it.
It seems to me quite possible that it refers to the lives, and
Dean Gavit, the Indiana University School of Law, so believes,
as revealed in his book. It also seems to me quite possible
that it refers to the estate which is granted. If it refers to the
latter, there is no difficulty with it. If it refers to the former
you may have some real difficulties with it, and those difficulties
will cause interests which would be good under the commonlaw rule to be bad under your Indiana statute.
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Now, like New York, you have a different statute which
applies to personal property, and that is the one which follows:
"No limitation or condition shall suspend the absolute ownership of
personal property longer than till the termination of lives in being at
the time of execution of the instrument containing such limitation or
condition, or, if in a will, of lives in being at the death of the testator." 4
Observe that the words "therein specified" are omitted, and
that there is no exception for remainders to take effect in the
presence of a previous remainder before the first remainder
man reaches 21. Why it should be that there is a difference
between the rule against perpetuities as applied to real property and as applied to personal property, no one, I think, has
even undertaken to explain. If there is an explanation, it
ought to be a very good one, because as you know the usual
clause which calls these sections into operation is a residuary
clause setting up a trust, and that residuary clause, nine times
out of ten, will be disposing of real and personal property
together. It ought to be a very good reason which will cause
a gift as to real property to be valid and a gift as to personal
property to be invalid, or vice versa.
Now, the personal property section also omits a clause
which the New York statute contains. The New York statute
is Personal Property Law, Section 11,5 and it has a final clause
that provides that in other respects, the rules as to devolution
4 Burns' Ind. Stat. 1933, § 51-101.
5 The absolute ownership of personal property shall not be suspended by
any limitation or condition for a longer period than during the continuance and
until the termination of not more than two lives in being at the date of the
instrument containing such limitation or condition, or, if such instrument be a
last will and testament, for not more than two lives in being at the death of the
testator; except that a contingent gift in remainder may be made on a prior
gift in remainder, to take effect in the event that the persons to whom the first
remainder is limited die under the age of twenty-one years, or on any other
contingency by which the interest of such persons may be determined before
they attain full age. For the purposes of this section a minority is deemed a
part of a life, and not an absolute term equal to the possible duration of such
minority. Lives in being or a minority in being shall include a child begotten
before the creation of the estate but born thereafter. In other respects limitations of future or contingent interests in personal property are subject to the
rules prescribed in relation to future estates in real property.
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of personal property shall be governed by the rules as to
devolution of real property. It seems to me not impossible
that a great deal of difficulty may arise in the future on the
question whether certain rules which your statutes specify
as applicable to real property can properly be held applicable
to personal property. 6
Now, as an example of the kind of thing which I mean when
I say that other related sections were not brought over from
the New York Real Property Law, I refer to the word
"remainder" near the end of the real property section. I
was not able to find in your statutes a definition of the word
"remainder."
The New York statute defines the remainder-not a remainder as anything you ever heard of in law school, but a
remainder for purposes of those acts. The word "remainder"
as defined in the New York Real Property Law makes sense
in this section. The word "remainder," as used apart from
the definition given-its ordinary common law meaningdoes not, I submit, make sense here for reasons which I will
later discuss.
Now, to comment on certain aspects of those statutes. I
suggest to you that this is not only missionary work, but that
in these comments what we are developing from your point
of view as users of these statutes are certain fundamental
conceptions as to the nature of the thing we are dealing with
and that you must deal with.
I should be delighted if anything that I say shall cause
some movement to be initiated to bring about an amendment
to these statutes. But entirely apart from that it seems to
me that a discussion of the fundamental problems of these
statutes (and they are fundamental differences from the
common-law rule) is a useful thing to build upon in more
detail.
The common-law rule requires that the interest must vest
within the period specified by that rule which is lives in being,
plus 21 years. That is, that the interest in question must
be given actually in possession or must have that quality which
the common law gave to vested remainders, even before they
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came into possession. The common law concept of the vesting
of an interest which is not yet possessory, is a highly metaphysical thing. You don't find it in any other law. We have that
concept of an interest which is at once future and present,
future as to possession, present as to the existence of the
future right. Hence the common-law rule is satisfied if the
interest becomes possessory within the period of the rule, or
if it becomes vested in interest under our peculiar common
law idea that that thing can take place before it becomes possessory. You are, of course, familiar with the fact that
the so-called executory interest, that is, the shifting or springing use, or shifting or springing executive devise never had
the capacity for vesting in interest. In the words of my old
preceptor, the old preceptor of many of you, to-wit, Bill
Warren, the common law remainder had the quality of patient
politeness. It came in immediately after the preceding estate,
but didn't hurry it a bit. It waited until the preceding estate
was all through and then came in immediately. It didn't overlap the preceding estate, in which case it would have been a
shifting executory interest. It didn't leave a gap between it
and the preceding estate in which case it would have been a
springing executory interest. No lap, no gap-patiently
polite !
Thus, thecommon law remainder was the only type of interest which had the capacity of being vested in interest before
it became vested in possession. Of course, all reversionary
interest (including the very thin possibility of reverter), were
vested because they were things that just remain in the grand
total.
But the statutes do not require that, and are not satisfied
with that. Your statute requires that the power of alienation
shall not be suspended, which is a different thing as the two
problems indicate. I am now assuming that the suspension
of the power of alienation means in Indiana what it means
in New York, which, as I suggested a few moments ago,
may be a violent and false assumption. If it doesn't mean
that we can never tell what it does mean until your court has
told us.
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Take problem one:
"1. To the A church in fee simple, but if the premises ever cease
to be used for church purposes, then to B."
Now, that gift to B is void under the common-law rule. It
is an executory interest, a shifting executory devise. It may
not vest in possession until long after lives in being, and twentyone years. Hence it fails under the common-law rule and
A has a fee simple absolute.
Under the Indiana statute, subject, however, to another
questionable construction to be discussed later,6 I issue the
caveat at this point that under the Indiana statutes it would
seem that the interest in B was valid, because A and B can
at any time get together and give an absolute fee simple of
the property.
The New York statute defines the suspension of the power
of alienation as follows:
"The absolute power of alienation is suspended when there are no
1
persons in being by whom an absolute fee in possession can be conveyed. 7
There are persons in being that can convey an absolute fee
in possession. Those persons are A and B.
So problem one presented a situation in which your statutes
appear to be more lenient than the common-law rule.
Problem two is just the reverse:
"2. Property in trust for A for life, then for A's children for their
lives, then for B."

Under the common-law rule, all interests are valid. A's
interest is, of course, good. A's children's interest must vest
in possession at A's death. Hence they are valid. The fact
that they will extend beyond the period of perpetuities is no
objection because the test of the common-law rule is vesting,
6The question "Do the Indiana statutes by implication require that an
interest vest within lives in being as well as requiring that there be no suspension
beyond that period?" will be discussed later in this paper.
7 N. Y. Real Property Law, § 42.
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not the duration of the estate, and the interest of B is valid
because that is a vested remainder at the outset. Hence,
everything is good.
Now, you might say that that ought also to be good under
the Indiana statutes, because at A's death, A's children and
B together can convey an absolute fee, and you can suspend
the power of alienation or the absolute ownership during
the existence of any number of lives in being at the time of the
creation of the interest, and all that you are suspending is
the ownership during A's life. That line of argument would
be sound except for the fact that your statute, 8 provides that
a beneficiary of a trust of real estate cannot dispose of his
interest unless the right of disposal is expressly given. That
is, an automatic spendthrift clause is imposed upon beneficial
interests under trusts of real estate unless the reverse is expressly stated. Hence, at A's death A's children cannot
convey an absolute fee, because the statute says they can't,
and hence, in Indiana it seems clear that the gift in problem
two is void because not until all children of A have died can
an absolute fee in possession be given. And it may be that the
children are not lives in being at the time of the testator's
death. But if the property involved is personal, to which this
statute does not expressly apply, and if the court does not rule
that section 56-604 is by implication applicable to personalty,
or if real estate is involved, and there is an express power to
alienation given in the instrument then the case in problem
two is a valid limitation.
Now, I ask you, in all honesty, does that state of the law
make sense? Are there reasons why that gift should be good
as to land and bad as to stocks and bonds? Are there reasons
why we should have to wait for the court to determine whether
section 56-604 applies to personalty? I understand there are
some cases which tend to indicate it should not. Should the
validity of that interest depend upon whether the beneficiaries
of the trust have the right to convey or don't have the right
to convey? Are there really substantial interests of public
8 Burns' Ind. Stat. 1933, § 56-604.
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policy which are served by holding that thing invalid under
one circumstance and valid under the other?
My question suggests that the answer is no. If that is the
state of the law-and on the basis of such study as I have
been able to make of the Indiana law of perpetuities by reading as far as I know, every decision on the question that
appears in your reports, I am convinced that it is-it is a state
of the law about which something ought to be done. If that
has not yet arisen, it is the kind of a problem that you are
going to find.
Now, you are going to say to me, or think in your mind,
that isn't the kind of a limitation that people make. You
don't find cases where somebody gives property to A for life
and then to A's children for their lives and then to B. You
are right about that-you don't, in the first instance. What
happens is this: You get that case through the exercise of a
power of appointment. What happens is a testator leaves
property to A for life, remainder for him to appoint by will.
Then A leaves the property to A's children for their lives,
remainder to B. That is the way this sort of thing arises,
over and over again.
Bearing in mind the fact, as is pointed out later, that when
a power of appointment except inter vivos is exercised, and
further bearing in mind the fact that you have to read back
the appointment into the instrument creating the power for
purposes of the rule against perpetuities, the net result that
you come out with is this case, over and over and over againnot once but fifty times, in the course of a year, in the Massachusetts Probate Courts.
Your statute also presents this question:
"Do the Indiana statutes by implication require that an interest vest

within lives in being as well as requiring that there be no suspension
beyond that period ?"

That requires a brief dissertation on New York law. The
New York courts have held in the Matter of Wilcox9 that the
two-life rule imposed by the New York statutes not only
9 194 N. Y. 288, 87 N. E. 497.
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requires that the suspension of the power of alienation terminate within two lives, but also requires that the interest
vest within two lives. In other words, problem one above
is not a valid limitation in New York, although there is no
suspension of the power of alienation at all. A and B are
both living, and the minute the testator dies they can convey,
but that interest is not good in New York. It isn't good in
New York, because the courts have construed into the perpetuity statute, not only the requirement of termination of
suspension of the power of alienation that appears there,
but also a requirement of vesting.
Now, how they have done that takes us about two hours,
in my course in Property Three, to point out, and I am certainly not going to undertake to do it here in two minutes.
Matter of Wilcox, supra, will give you some suggestion as to
how it is going to be done.
Another case which my students will remember is Walker
v. Marcellus & 0. L. Ry. Company,' ° which deals with the
same problem. Chaplain has a book on the suspension of
power of alienation, which deals with New York."- Under
your present statute Chaplain is an Indiana textbook because
when it comes to construction of these statutes you have really
to go back to the source of the legislation, which is New York,
and Chaplain deals with this at length.
Suffice it to say that for reasons sufficient to the New York
courts they have imposed the requirement of vesting within
the specified period by implication. There is a vital difference.
I am going to say only this as to this background material.
There is a vital difference between the Indiana and New York
statutory setup due to the fact that although your section
56-142 is a paraphrase of section 42 of the New York Real
Property Law, there is another section in New York, to-wit 50,
which is not in your code. That section 50 was a large part
of the basis upon which the New York courts imported the
requirements of vesting into their perpetuities law.
10 226 N. Y. 34-7, 123 N. E. 736.
11 Chaplin, Suspension of the Power of Alienation.
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But in the District of Columbia, and in Kentucky, where
something like your statutory setup exists, although there are
considerable differences, responsible people in those jurisdictions have come to the conclusion that Matter of Wilcox,
supra, the New York case, will be applicable there. 12 Whether
it will be applicable here is one of those unanswered questions
which must ultimately be answered at the cost of some unfortunate client who has the doubtful privilege of settling a law,
unless there is something radical done about your Indiana
statutes.
Again the Indiana statute differs from the common law in
this:
"The Indiana statutes allow no period of years (such as 21 years,

which the common-law Rule allows) in addition to lives in being."
Why did the common-law rule against perpetuities put the
21-year period in? Well, for this reason: the common-law
rule against perpetuities-and indeed I suppose every statutory rule against perpetuities was designed to thwart capricious, vain dispositions. Now, the most natural thing in the
world for a man to want to do is to take care of his children
and grandchildren. The most natural way to do that is to
provide, subject to proper power, that the income of his
property should go to his children for their lives and then
the property should go to his grandchildren. Grandchildren
at any age? No. Grandchildren who are old enough to
take care of property, and the age of 21, in the old days,
was the age which was accepted as manhood.

Of course, you and I know that it makes a lot of difference
whether the duties of a man are riding a horse, carrying a
spear and wearing a tin suit, or on the other hand, consist of
judgment in the handling of investment funds. There is much
to be said for the fact that the ancient age of majority at 21
is far too low at the present time, but we are not going to
try to change anything that is as fundamentally rooted as that.
12 Updegraff, The Rule against Perpetuities in the D. C.; 14 Georgetown
L. J. 336; Roberts, Kentucky Statute against Perpetuities, 16 Ky. L.

also Gavit, Indiana Law of Future Interests 242.

3.

97; see
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The notion was that he wanted to be able to leave property
to his children for their lives, and to his grandchildren when
they were old enough to take care of it, and that, under the
old notion, was 21 years. So lives in being and 21 years lets
them do that. Moreover, the fact that the 21-year period is
in gross, and is not attached to any minority, enables a man
to do certain things unrelated to lives within a relatively short
period; that is, 21 years. It gives him some latitude to make
dispositions which are not connected with lives.
Now, your provision for lives only, excludes the possibility
of taking into account the minority of the remainderman,
except in so far as your statute relating to real estate covers
it, there being no statute as to personalty. Thus it prevents
a man from making dispositions which are not related to
lives.
Now, frequently a man wants to do something that has no
relation to any lives in being. I dare say many of you have
run into the situation where a man has been making up out
of his pocket bonuses for his employes, and he wants that to
continue for a certain time after his death. He wants to
reward continuation in service in his business by additional
payments out of his estate for a period of years-reward not
only the people who are there who would be lives in being,
but people who may be employed.
That sort of thing, the sort of thing that induces the creation of trusts, limited by a number of years rather than by
the lives of persons, is frequently, as things turn out, a desirable thing to do. But you can't do it here, and it is by reason
of the fact that the 21-year period in the common-law rule is
stricken out in Indiana.
For example, take that case of Phillips v. Heldt.13 There
was a trust of real estate for one year. It is bad under your
rule. It is bad because it isn't limited by any particular number
of lives and because the statute forbids the beneficiaries of
trusts to alienate the property during that one-year period.
Of course, if your draftsman had in mind the Indiana statute
of perpetuities it is the easiest thing in the world to take
13 33 Ind. App. 3881 71 N. E, 540.
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care of it. That he picks out a half dozen lives doesn't make
any difference, and says, the trust is to last one year, or during
the duration of these lives, whichever is shorter, and, of
course, he comes out with a perfectly good trust. But my
point is that your statute lays a trap for the unwary, in situations which are perfectly reasonable, and where no man who
didn't have an expert knowledge in this field would have the
slightest notion that there was a perpetuity question involved.
How many of you would feel, if you didn't know the terms of
this statute, when you were setting up a trust for one year,
that you ought to look up the rule against perpetuities? It is
by imposing a mathematical formula which is fundamentally,
as I suggest, an unsound one. You are laying a trap for
persons who are trying to do perfectly reasonable decent
things.
Secondly, look at this: A gift to "such of my issue as are
living one year after my death" is bad.
Of course it is. If it were, "such of my children," that
would be all right, because, of course, the children of themselves are lives in being and the power of alienation will be
suspended no longer than those lives in any case. But here
is a fellow who has a child that may die leaving issue during
the year. He wants to benefit the people available at the
period of distribution, and he can't do it, unless being an
appreciant fellow, he realizes that the Indiana rule against
perpetuities forbids doing this, as it would naturally be done,
and protects the thing by an artificial period of perpetuities,
as I have stated; that is, picking out a half dozen persons and
saying, "gift to my issue, who has been living to the survivor
of these people or one year after my death, which is early."
New York has this same difficulty, and as I shall point out
at the very end of this talk, here and in New York, the
absence of any period of years in gross included in your rule
against perpetuities raises a terrific dilemma, when you are
dealing with commercial transactions which may be subject to
the rule against perpetuities. And there are some. Commercial transactions which are subject to the rule against perpetuities practically everywhere are options to purchase. That
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is in gross unconnected with the lease, options to purchase in
a lease, and stock option warrants, or conversion privileges
in bonds under certain circumstances.
In its fourth report, the New York Decedent Estate Commission has indicated the hardships that are caused by having
14
the period of perpetuities not include some period of years.
Now, the exception in the real property statute. That
reads:
"With the exception that a contingent remainder in fee may be created
on a prior remainder in a fee to take effect in the event the persons or
first owner, limited shall die under the age of 21, or any other contingency that will exist under their minority."
Now, how does it apply to the two cases which I state?
And I suggest to you that the first of these cases is the natural
disposition, and I suggest to you that in all probability that
natural disposition is void although the second one which is
an unnatural disposition, and that the result is probably valid.
First problem:
"To my children for life, remainder to my grandchildren who shall
reach 21, but if all die under 21 then to A."
Observe that no grandchild takes a vested interest until he
is twenty-one years old. To be sure, he has a contingent
remainder up to that time, and under your Indiana law he
can probably convey that as a contingent remainderman. He
can convey it as a contingent remainderman except for the fact
that he is a minor.
Query: Under what circumstances could a guardian convey
it? Does the power of a guardian to convey when, as, and if
authorized by the appropriate court appointing the guardiandoes that prevent the suspension of the power of alienation?
There is one of the things you are going to have to be illuminated upon by your court.
They do not get rights, they do not get vested remainders
until they are twenty-one years old. If the requirement of
14Fourth Report of N. Y. Decedent Estate Commission 254 (1932).
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vesting is imputed into your statute, is employed in your
statute as it has been in New York, and as they say it has to
be in the District of Columbia and in Kentucky, it is as clear
as can be that this case is void, because the interest will not be
vested within lives in being which are the children. It will
only be vested twenty-one years after the children, die. The
probability is that your court will rule that the interest must
vest within the period specified, that is lives in being. If so,
that one is bad, because there is nothing in the remainder, in the
exception to the statute, which saves it, since the only thing
saved by that exception is the gift over if they fail to reach
twenty-one. It has nothing to do with the original remainder.
Look at problem two:
"To my children for life, remainder to my grandchildren, but if any
grandchild dies under 21 then his share (including any accrued share)
shall go to the survivors, but if all die under 21 then the property shall
go to A."
Now, that one has a chance of success. It has a chance of
success because the exception in the statute provides that a
gift over of another remainder, if the prior remainderman
dies under twenty-one, is valid. It has a chance of success,
unless the court should rule that that can only be done once,
that you can only have one remainder, limited over on a prior
remainder, but that you can't have the accrued share going
over. Suppose there are five children. Child 1 dies at the
age of six. His share goes to the other four. Now, Child 2
dies at the age of 8. His original share goes to the other
three, but can the interest which he acquired from Child 1 go
over to the other three? And when they all die under twentyone can the whole works go over to A because one of those
interests of A will have been four times accrued with four
children already. Another question that your court has to
decide.
Moreover, if you will observe any common law definition
of the word remainder, those second interests are not remainders at all; they are all executory interests. They do not
jibe with any definition of the word remainder, except a
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definition that appears in the New York statutes and was not
imported by Indiana at the time they took these sections.
Hence, I suggest to you that if this statute permits anything as to gifts to grandchildren which will not really accrue
to them until they reach twenty-one, it permits a thing which
is an extraordinary complex and an unnatural form of limitation, and clearly doesn't allow the natural form of gift which
a testator would want to make and which a draftsman would
naturally draw.
Then you have that final question, Does this thing apply to
personalty? If it doesn't, is there good reason why there
should be an exception as to such gifts which does not apply
to real estate?
Well, apart from background material this discussion has
been given to create seeds of unrest, if not already there.
From such conversations as I have had with those with whom
I have already talked, there is a pretty thorough understanding that you are up against some difficulties in your Indiana
law of perpetuities. The question is, What can or should be
done about it?
You are not alone. Connecticut, Ohio and Alabama had
statutes which-and this is strong language-were infinitely
less workable than yours. Each of those states repealed their
statutes and enacted a very simple law. The Ohio law was
enacted as recently as 1932, Alabama in 1931, and Connecticut in 1895. Each of these states repealed its existing
statutes and established the common-law rule against perpetuities.
THE TREND BACK TO THE COMMON-LAW RULE.

That rule grew up in the finest tradition of the English
common-law over a period of almost exactly one hundred
and fifty years. The first case announcing the common law
was the Duke of Norfolk's Case15 in 1680, and the definitive
decision which completed the picture except for variations of
detail was Kadell v. Palmer 6 in 1833. One hundred and
15 3 ch. cas. 1.
16 1 cl. 8 F. 372.
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fifty years that thing grew up by an accretion of the wisdom
of the English judges seeking to impose restraints upon vanity
and caprice, without keeping reasonable men from making
decent family dispositions. It began in 1680 and it is in
effect in all but 13, in 35 of the American States today, absolutely unchanged from the time when it was first announced,
and as it finally developed up until 1833.
Now, there are a precious few rules of the common law
which have been developed in that cautious way, and have
stood the test of time the way this one has. It is not lacking
in significance that the Legislatures of Connecticut, Alabama
and Ohio came to the conclusion when they found their own
rules against perpetuities didn't work that they wanted to go
way back to the common law. The common-law rule is essentially simple.
Now, everybody, every lawyer has for some reason or
other, a tendency to feel that the rule against perpetuities is
an abstruse thing, something to be afraid of, and that it takes
a long, long time to get the slightest idea of what it means.
I felt that very strongly as the result of teaching it and
talking about it to lawyers, and for the purpose of indicating
that it wasn't true, I tried almost exactly two years ago to
take the common-law rule against perpetuities and substantially everything that relates to it and put it in thirty pages
of type-that is, to write a thirty-page textbook on the
common-law rule against perpetuities. And it is a standing
challenge to have pointed out some problem with regard to
perpetuities that isn't covered in those thirty pages. The thing
that I have referred to is that article on "Perpetuities in a
Nutshell."' 17 That thing could have been cut down a third or
even half if I had been willing to leave out the illustrative cases
that were put in to try to make it abundantly clear.
The common-law rule is essentially simple. It is workable.
There has been a consistent body of authority with reference
to it. To be sure, from time to time there are records that
the court has got off the track, but after it has, there has been
a tendency to come back, to try to overrule its previous deci17 Leach, Perpetuities in a Nutshell, 51 Harv. L. R. 638.
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sions, more than in any other field. It is easy to see where
they got off the track and then tried to get back. If your
legislature ever comes to the conclusion that there is something
wrong with regard to the perpetuities law in Indiana it is
going to be a hard thing for you to hope to do a better thing
than put Indiana back in the long list of states which are
working satisfactorily under the common-law rule.
Now, let's talk about the detail of the rule, in the course
of which we shall be considering some of the problems which
are most troublesome.
The Indiana rule, like the common-law, allows the period
to be measured by any number of lives in being; that is, any
number of lives in being provided they are not so numerous
that you cannot ascertain when they fall, in which case the
instrument for the gift falls, not because of the rule against
perpetuities, but because of the rule of uncertainty.
I have a little quotation in there which is just a crotchet on
my part: This gorgeous old case of Scattergood v. Edge,'8
where they first decided that you could have any number of
lives, and the opinion reads: "For let the lives be never so
many, still 'tis but the length of one life; for as Twisden used
to say, the candles are all lighted at once."
I give you that because I promise you you will remember it.
LIVES IN BEING

In 1916, the Editor of Burk's Peerage stated it appeared
in his columns that a witness had testified that, as far as he
knew, there were 224 descendants of Queen Victoria living
in some 19 different countries; and that he had to inject "so
far as he knew" because he had no actual knowledge or
means of finding out, whether the children of the Czar and
Czarina of Russia had really been killed by the Bolsheviks,
or whether, as some people allege, they are wandering around.
Well, anyway, 224 people was considered not too many
lives in that case, but naturally none of us is going to do a
thing like that. However, ten or a dozen is all right.
18 1 Salk. 229.
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"Under the common-law Rule the persons upon whose lives the Rule
is measured need not be mentioned, need not be the holders of previous
estates, and need have no connection with the property or with the
persons designated to take it. But the Indiana statute as to realty
requires that the lives be "therein specified."
Now let us take the following problem:
"To A for life, remainder to my grandchildren living at A's death
or thereafter born." Testator has living children. In a will, valid
under the common-law rule, query in Indiana. In an inter vivos trust,
invalid both at common-law and in Indiana."

Well, of course, that is as good as gold under the' common
law if it is in a will, because my grandchildren must necessarily be born within the lives of my children who are lives in
being, and although the children are never mentioned in the
will and take no estate, they nevertheless are lives in being,
which will render the gifts good under the common law.
Observe this, however, and this has a generic or broader
significance: "To my grandchildren who shall reach the age
of twenty-one" is perfectly good in a will, but it is bad in an
inter vivos trust. Do you observe why?
It is bad in such a trust because it is possible that after the
date of the trust more children may be born to the testator,
and the grandchildren may be the issue of those unborn children. A gift to grandchildren of the testator in a will is
always good, if it isn't an age in excess of twenty-one because
the children are necessarily lives in being due at the death of
the testator himself. But a gift to the grandchildren by an
inter vivos is not necessarily good, though limited to twentyone, because more children may be born to him. The generic
significance of that remark is this: it does not follow from the
fact that a gift is good in a will, that it is also good in an
inter vivos trust. The soundness of a trust in a will may well
depend upon the fact that the testator is dead and hence can
have no more children. If it does depend upon that factor,
then a similar gift in an inter vivos trust will not be valid
because, of course, that situation doesn't exist.
19 284 Pa. 334, contra, Ward v. Van der Loeff (1924), A. C. 653; Jee v.
Audley, 1 Cox Eq. Cas. 324.
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Now, query whether that gift is good in Indiana, even in a
will, because the lives in being which will make that gift to
the grandchildren good at common law, are not specified. The
children are the lives in being, and no specification of those
lives has been made.
Dean Gavit, in his book, thinks it would still be good.
Naturally, he may be right and probably his guess is a good
deal better than mine. I have no guess, which is one good
reason, but it is perfectly clear also that whether his guess
is right or not is an issue that is going to have to be litigated
if this statute stays on the books.
There are two little addenda I would like to make, one to
something I said this morning and one to something I said
this afternoon-I mean something I didn't say this morning.
The power of appointments is frequently a very useful thing
in keeping down income taxes in this situation.
Suppose a father has a son who is doing well in business,
say an income of twenty thousand a year, and he wants to leave
to him property which will produce an income of ten or fifteen
thousand dollars a year. If he leaves that property to him,
the income taxes the boy will be paying on the additional
increment from his father's estate will be at the surtax rates
which begin at the end of the son's earned income and will be
fairly high.
What he can do in that situation is to leave the property
not to the son, but to the son's wife, who has no earned income.
The result will be that she is paying an income tax upon ten
or fifteen thousand dollars starting from scratch, not starting
at the surtax rates at which the son's earned income leaves off.
Of course, the difficulty with that is that the son and the wife
may get into a row, and that the wife will then have the
property that the man meant for his son, and that is where
the power of appointment can come in, because the property
can be left in a trust for the wife, and the son given the power
of appointment to divest that interest in favor of himself
or anybody else. If the son doesn't get into a row with his
wife, then the income is coming in to his wife and she is
paying the tax at the lower rate. If he does get into a row
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with her, he has to pay, under those circumstances, the higher
rate, but if the family goes along as everybody expects, nice
and smoothly, then a very considerable amount of income
taxes is saved.
The second thing I wanted to talk about is this: While I
was out in the corridor, two or three people spoke to me
about the technique of getting the Indiana statutes changed,
if anybody should make up their minds they wanted to take
the time and trouble to do it, and I think I should call attention to the trouble that they had in New York. The New
Yorkers are sick and tired of their rule against perpetuities
and there have been movements to amend that thing for a
long, long time. But they made a great mistake: The trust
companies have always got behind them.
Now, you can see why that is a mistake. There isn't any
question that a liberalization of the rule against perpetuities
will be of benefit to the trust companies. It will also be of
benefit to lawyers who act as trustees, and the up-country
legislators have always had the feeling that these movements
to amend the New York rule against perpetuities were just
trust company propaganda and entirely apart from the merits.
Those beliefs on the part of the legislators have been successful
in preventing the amendment from carrying through.
Well, in 1932, however, the New York legislature did
repeal their rule against perpetuities and re-established the
common-law rule, passed the statutes to that effect, and then
somebody got to the Governor and began pouring some kind
of poison into his ear, and the Governor of the State at
that time was who you know and that legislation was
vetoed. I suggest to you, as a matter of practical wisdom,
that any movement to put the common-law rule back in force
in Indiana as it has been in Connecticut, Alabama and Ohio,
that the trust companies should keep as jolly well far away
from it as they can, and that the movement ought to be
started by somebody whose motives cannot be impugned as
being anything other than the improvement of the law. I can
think of nobody better for that purpose than the persons at
your University who specialize in this field.
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TECHNIQUE OF APPLICATION OF THE RULE

"The situation is viewed as of testator's death or creation of the
trust; and it is immaterial that, viewing the case as of the time litigation
arises, the estates have vested and the suspension of the power of alienation has terminated within the prescribed period."
That is fundamental; that is true everywhere. The interest
is either good when the testator dies, on the basis of any
possibility which can be viewed as of that time, or it is bad.
Hence you have this case:
"To A for life, remainder to A's children who reach 25." At testator's
death A is still living (and is conclusively presumed to be capable of
having more children, regardless of sex and age.20 At A's death it
appears either that (a) no more children are born to A, or (b) all
children have reached 25 in the life of A."
That doesn't make any difference. The fact that when
the case is litigated it appears the suspension terminated in
time or the vesting occurred in time, that is immaterial. Then,
of course, there is that delicious and hearteningly subsidiary
rule that it "being conclusively presumed that any person is
capable of having children, regardless of sex and age."
Not only must the interest be looked at from the time when
testator died or the trust was set up, but from that time there
must be an absolute mathematical certainty, that all the contingencies will happen in time.
Now, what absolute mathematical certainty means is indicated by these next three cases, and I offer these under the
promise that I made in the introductory material of calling to
your attention cases in which really reasonable, natural things
are forbidden, not only by the Indiana rule, but by the commonlaw rule-things with reference to which one's mind never
runs in the direction of perpetuities at all, things which are
readily corrected if you see that the perpetuities exist, but
where the existence of such a problem is hardly suspected.
Look at the first: If a man is engaged in the gravel business and at the time of his death had three or four daughters
who don't know anything about running gravel pits, and has a
2

o Jee v. Audley, 1 Cox Eq. Cas. 324.
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couple of trusted employes who know the business and can
take care of it-sets up trust.
"Gravel pits to trustees to work out the pits (actually and predictably
exhausted in 4 years) sell the land at public auction and distribute the
proceeds to my issue then living."
He thought the pits would be worked out in four years. He
had three or four daughters. He expected they would be
worked out within the lives of those daughters. Everybody
thought the same thing, but there was a mathematical possibility that they wouldn't be worked out under the commonlaw rule of twenty-one years, or in Indiana law, within the
lives of the daughters. So the thing appears a perfectly
reasonable disposition. All you have to say is, that if all of
the issues living at the time of his death should die before
the gravel pits are worked out, then the property shall pass
to them outright. It will never happen in the wide, wide
world. This would save the gift from the rule against perpetuities.
Look at the second one-another natural case. Here is a
man that owns rent producing commercial real estate, subject
to a mortgage. The mortgage calls for serial payments, the
rent is $1,750 a year, and five thousand dollars only to go
to clear up the mortgage. This testator has got a perfectly
sound notion that what he wants to do is to see that these
children get this property free and clear. He has had too
much experience with hard times where a bank clamps down
upon property, upon mortgagees who can be made to pay.
The minute that money gets tight and the rents and profits
get low, then the bank comes in and claims its due, and the
testator wants to protect it. So he says, "I want this property
to go to trustees to pay off the mortgage out of income; then
when the mortgage is paid off to turn over to my heirs that
shall be living at that time"-a foresighted idea. Yet that
is bad, because although everybody thinks that the income
will be able to pay that mortgage off within the lives of his
children, the Indiana rule, or within twenty-one years under
common-law rule-although everybody thinks that and it
might be true, it might happen that the income of that property
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would go down, and so the gift is bad. All these were bad
under the common-law, as well as the Indiana rule.
It is easy to cure. All you have to say is, if this mortgage
is not paid off within the lives of A, B, and C, and then at
their deaths the subject to be turned over to the issue living
at that time. That will not happen, but that makes it possible
for the other disposition to become valid.
This is worse-"To my issue living at the time of distribution of my estate." And the other was, "To my issue living
at the time of probate of my will." The testator realizes it
is going to take time for the will to be administered. He
said, "When the estate is distributed, I want you to turn it to
living people, to such of my issue as are living at that time."
The court says that is bad. That is bad, although they
expect the estate will be administered in a year or two, during
the lives in being. Under your Indiana rule, there is a possibility that it might not be. Hence, it is all bad. The cure, of
course, the same thing, provides if by chance the estate is not
administered within the lives of A, B, and C, it shall pass to
the issues living at the deaths of A, B, and C.
In other words, in these cases, where you have a case where
there is interest contingent upon any event, no matter how
approximate it is to the time of the testator's death, or the
creation of the trust, it is desirable, natural and imperative
to provide your own little artificial period of perpetuities, and
provide if the contingency doesn't occur sooner than you
expect it will, your little artificial period of perpetuities will
govern.
APPLICATION OF THE RULE TO INTERESTS CREATED BY
EXERCISE OF A POWER OF APPOINTMENT

That is a simple matter, and yet one which is frequently
overlooked. I have here a series of little cases, which solve
themselves on the basis of simple propositions, which I am
now going to set forth.
As to a special power, that is, to "A for life, remainder to
such issue as he may appoint." The question is as to the
validity of the appointed interest, when A exercises the power.
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Put it this way: The appointed interest is valid only if it
will vest under the common-law rule, or terminate the power
of suspension under the Indiana rule, within the period of
perpetuities computed from the creation of the power; that is,
the period of perpetuities is computed from the testator's
death, not from A's death.
Or to put it in a different way: The appointment is treated
somewhat as the exercise of a power of attorney. The
testator, the donor of the power, leaves blanks in his will and
says to A, the donee of the power, "You fill in the blanks."
And hence, when A fills in the blanks he is making the testator's
will for him, and the validity of that disposition is determined
as if the testator had done it himself. As the courts so frequently say, the appointment is read back into the instrument
creating the power. Hence, as to interests created by the
exercise of a special power, the period of perpetuities is computed from the donor's death, that is the creation of the power,
not from the donee's death-that is, it is exercised.
As to general powers exercisable by will only, the same rule
applies: that is, the appointment is read back, and the period
of perpetuities is computed from the creation of the power.
As to appointments under a general power which could be
exercised by deed, whether it is exercised in fact by deed or
will, it is the nature of the power, the permission as to method
of exercise given by the power, not the method which is chosen
by the donee that counts. As to a general power which could
be exercised by deed, whether in fact it is or not, the period
of perpetuities is computed from the exercise of the power,
not from its creation-a different rule, that is, and that is
good sense. It isn't just a technical rule. The motion is that
where a person has a general power exercisable by deed, he
could appoint the whole thing to himself, and if he did appoint
to himself, then he would be able to devise or bequeath that
property as his own property.
Now, instead of doing that double thing, appointing to
himself and then devising or bequeathing it as owned property,
he makes an appointment to somebody else. The transaction
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is given the same consequences as far as the perpetuities law
is concerned, as if he had gone through the double process:
that is, the general power exercisable by deed is in this particular treated as equivalent to ownership in fee by him.
Those rules are simple and understandable. I think the
discretionary trust which is a power of appointment is worth
noticing. I have always talked about powers of appointment
here. as being powers in somebody who is a life tenant, but
you don't have to have a power in the life tenant. Frequently
enough the power is in the trustee. The trustee has the power
to determine the shares in which income shall be received by
children, or the disposition which shall be made of the principal at the death of the life tenant. If the trustee has that
power, he has a power of appointment just as much as the life
tenant has.
If, on the other hand, you can give it to an absolute
stranger, give it to John Jones, who has no connection with
the property and can never benefit by it, that is a power of
appointment, too.
As a matter of fact, some of the New York offices have a
very interesting device which they habitually employ. A man
sets up his will, as he likes. And then he gives a power of
appointment to a committee of three persons which is selfperpetuated, entitling them to make any change in the will
which they want at any time, provided that neither they nor
any persons related to them benefits by the change.
Now, the persons that are selected are three of the partners
of the law firm which draws the will, and it is understood
among them that the reason for that power of appointment,
to kick out any gift, substitute for it any other gift, eliminate
any beneficiary from the will, is only this: The testator
figures he can amend that will just as fast as Congress can
amend the tax laws up until he dies, but that after his death
he has lost the power, so he gives it to these people, and he
understands that is all he has them there for, to keep that
will from doing things which will stick the estate for a large
amount of taxes in the event of some drastic amendment of
the tax laws.
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Now, I have considered that device, and for reasons which
may or may not appeal to you it has not seemed wise to
follow it.
I cite that as an example of the fact that a power of appointment can be not only in the life tenants of a trust, but can be
in the trustee or can be in some rank outsider.
CONSTRUCTION AND THE RULE

Now, construction is a matter which becomes important in
a tremendous number of instances, and the issue is this: Suppose that on one construction a will will be valid under the
rule against perpetuities, and on another construction of the
same language the will would be invalid.
What effect should that have upon the court in determining
which construction to adopt? Can the court in approaching
the issue of construction say to itself, "We will favor the construction of this instrument which will produce valid interest."
Now, the English view on that purports to be very hardboiled. They say: "We will construe this will as if no perpetuities question were involved, and then to the instrument
thus construed, we will remorselessly apply the rule against
perpetuities."
Well, you can say that, and they do, but I strongly suggest
to you that that is not sound. I tell you on the basis of the
American authorities, and more particularly the recent American authorities that I have read, that it is not the American
practice and it certainly is divergent from an analogy with
which we are thoroughly familiar in the field of constitutional
law, that is very persuasive.
Of course, we know that on the issue of constitutionality
of a statute, the Supreme Court of the United States will
submit language to the most horrible torture for the purpose
of producing a constitutional result; not only of producing a
constitutional result, but of producing a result which will not
even raise a constitutional question. The leading authority
on that is the case of Delaware and Hudson,21 which I have
21

United States v. Del. & H. R. R., 213 U. S. 366.
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suggested. The analogy is perfect. In each case we are
dealing with a written instrument created by someone who
was subjected to a restriction by law. In one case it is a
constitutional restriction; in the other case, it is a restriction
evolved for purposes of social policy which we call the rule
against perpetuities. In each case, we proceed from the primary assumption that the testator or Congress meant to do
a valid thing. If he hadn't been meaning to do a valid thing
he would never have put his pen to paper.
Proceeding on that assumption, however, and taking that
as a major premise, we say, if there is any possibility of construing this language in such a way as to produce a valid
interest, we will accept that construction. Why? Because
we must assume that the testator would prefer that a valid
22
construction be given to his instrument rather than an invalid.
"Almost invariably," I say, "the question is whether afterborn children are included in a class gift."
Take the case: "To A for life, remainder to her children
for their lives, and then to the children of such children." A
is fifty years old. Now, ordinarily, that second gift to children
means children whenever born. Ordinarily when you say for
life, remainder to A's children, that word "children" would
include a child born after the testator's death and during the
life of A.
Bearing in mind the fact that, first, A was fifty years old;
second, that if children includes after-born children, then the
gift to grandchildren is void. Should you not then rule that
in this case, children does not include after-born children, but
includes only those children who are in being at the death of
the testator. The case of WVright's Estate23 said, yes, you
should so construe it, and the English cases, as you might
guess, said no.
Now, of course, that thing can be carried too far, and I
want to read you a couple of excerpts from a Georgia case,
and then from one in Rhode Island.
Forman v. Troup, 30 Ga. 496.
23 284 Pa. 334.
22
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The general principle behind the Rule of Construction to
which I have been arguing, is, of course, the principle that
the testator intends to do a valid thing and hence you could

24
construe it as valid, but in the case of Forman v. Troup,

which was a Georgia case back in 1860- The issue arose as
to whether children in a particular will included after-born
children. Mr. Justice Lumpkin, after referring to the statutes
of New York, went on to point out that the testator in this
case was the former Governor George M. Troup of Georgia,
a man who in fact had named one of his daughters after one
great state, and named another after the great neighboring
state of Florida, that he was known to be a member of the
court. Then he wound out in this fine peroration:
"For myself, I shall never consent to such a construction of either
the Act of 1821 or of 1864, and of all men, never would I impute such
an intention to violate the laws of his state to a man who loved her,
and every letter of her laws, and every inch of her soil with an energy
24
and devotion that no soul could inspire, but that of George M. Troup."
Now, I say that was in the sunny South, back in the handin-the-vest-button days.
But this, my friends, is from the State of Rhode Island, in
1929. The issue there was whether Colonel Samuel Pomeroy
Colt, of Bristol, Rhode Island, had violated the rule against
perpetuities in his will.
The issue was whether the gift to children included afterborn children, and the conclusion was that he did not mean to
include after-born children. Therefore, that the gift was
valid. The reasoning is as follows:
"Col. Colt was a member of the bar of this state for many years
and was Attorney General for several years. It is presumed that he
knew of the rule against perpetuities and that he would not knowingly
make a will attempting to dispose of his property in violation of that
rule. Col. Colt was prominent in the social, political, and business life
of the state, a man of vision, big deeds, and generous impulses. He
accumulated a large fortune-organized the trust company which he
made executor of his will and trustee of his estate. By the eighteenth
24 Forman v. Troup, 30 Ga. 496.
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clause of his will he made a generous bequest to many persons in the
employ of the trust company. See Industrial Trust Co. v. Alves, 46 R. I.
16, 124 A. 260. Col. Colt was devoted to his family and wished to see
them happy and prosperous. He lived in the homestead where his
mother was born. In memory of his mother, he erected the Colt
Memorial High School for the town of Bristol on a portion of the
homestead estate, and in his will gave the town $100,000 in trust to
use and employ the income therefrom in perpetuity for the maintenance
of this memorial. He extended and developed the Colt farm on the
shores of Narragansett Bay, and as a part of the development constructed a beautiful motor drive through the farm and along the shore
of the bay, and at the entrance to the drive erected a sign: "Colt
Farm. Private Property. Public Welcome." This drive was used
by thousands of motorists for many years preceding the death of the
25
testator.
APPLICATION OF THE RULE TO OPTIONS
What I have to say applies, as you will observe, to options
to purchase real estate, and also to options in security trans-

actions, that is, stocks and bonds, where the option is specifically enforceable against particular property.
Now, that will not ordinarily be the case, either, because
no specific property, no specific shares, are subject to the
options or because the property is not unique in such a way
that the remedy at law for damage is inadequate; in other

words, that the person who is not broke can get money and
go out and buy the shares on the market, but if you get a case
where the option is referrable to particular property, and
where the shares are so unique that a remedy at law is inade-

quate, the same thing that I am saying will obviously be
applicable to option warrants, attached to stock or conversion
privileges and bonds, but its primary application is to options
to purchase real estate.
Now, the rule against perpetuities has nothing to do with
contracts as such.
But under the common-law cases-and I am going to discuss
first the common-law cases and then the Indiana variationsthe rule against perpetuities does apply to those contingent,
25 Colt v. Industrial Trust Company, 50 R. I. 242, 146 Atl. 628.
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equitable interests in property which are the consequence of
the specific enforceability of contracts, particularly contracts
where A, the owner of Black acre, gives B an option to purchase it. B has a contract which he can have specifically
enforced if A fails to perform-specifically enforce if B
exercises the option and performs the conditions which are a
portion of the option. That specific enforceability gives to B
a contingent, equitable interest in Black acre which, under the
common-law cases, is subject to the rule against perpetuities.
Now, it never should have been subject to the rule against
perpetuities. That, I am prepared not only to concede, but
to claim, because the rule against perpetuities wasn't intended
to cover this kind of a transaction. The rule against perpetuities grew up out of gift transactions in the family relationship, and the period of perpetuities, that is, lives in being
and twenty-one years, is a period which is admirably adapted
to imposing satisfactory limits upon gift transactions within
the family. It has no relevance to commercial transactions
where lives in being are not the normal basis, so the rule of
perpetuities should never have been applied to commercial
contracts of this character. If they wanted a limitation upon
options to purchase, fair enough, but not the rule against
perpetuities. Still it was done, and in the English case of
London & Southwestern Railroad v. Gomm, "6 they applied
the rule against perpetuities to an option to purchase in gross.
In gross, I say, as distinguished from an option attached to a
leasehold interest.
Now, in regard to an option to purchase in a lease, the
arguments against the application to the rule against perpetuities are infinitely stronger. Suppose you have a 99-year
lease, and an option to purchase at any time within the lease
hold period. The English laws said that option is subject to
the rule against perpetuities and is void. That, I suggest, is
thoroughly unsound. The purpose of the rule against perpetuities is to produce liquidity of property values, to enhance
alienability, to cause property to be developed, to keep it from
being tied up so it can't be developed.
26 London & Southwestern Ry. v. Gomm, 20 Ch. D. 562.
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Now, let's consider first the position of a leaseholder for
99 years who has an option to purchase; and then, secondly,
one who hasn't. If a man who has an option to purchase at
the end of his lease, or any time during his lease, can afford
to put up a million-dollar building on that property ten years
before his lease expires, because he knows he can get the
benefit of that property by exercising the option, but the man
who hasn't an option to purchase during his lease, can't afford
to put up a million-dollar building on his property ten years
before the lease expires. Indeed, it isn't economically practical
for him to improve that property at all, within the period of
depreciation of ordinary commercial property, say, thirty
years. In other words, the absence of the option to purchase,
in the person who has possession of the property, the absence
of property control over the future in the person who has
possession of the property, and who, if anybody, is going to
develop it, must operate it as a clog upon the use of that
property. If A owns Black acre, and B has an option to
purchase it, that is a bad thing, because A is in possession;
if the property is going to be developed, B has to do it, and
an option overhanging that land is a clog on its use. Of course,
some restriction should be put on the option in gross, and it
is insane to think that a man ought to be able to clog his
property indefinitely-maybe a century-he can prevent himself or any future purchaser from developing that property.
If, on the other hand, the person leases the property for a
long period, the lessee is the fellow who has absolute control
over the future of that property in such a way as to make it
economically practical to develop the property, if it is to be
developed.
So in a good many states-and the courts are cited in those
two articles in the Yale and Virginia Law Review 27 -in a good
many states, the laws have refused to hold options to purchase
in leases are subject to the rule against perpetuities, and hold
that such options are subject to no time restrictions whatsoever.
Now, what is your situation in Indiana? Obviously, an
option to purchase is no suspension of the power of alienation.
27 Abbott, 27 Yale L. J. 878 Langeluttig, 17 Va. L. Rev. 461.
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That is, if A owns Black acres and B has an option to pur-

chase, A and B together can give an absolute fee. The only
reason you might get into trouble with options in Indiana is

if the court rules that not only do the Indiana statutes forbid
suspension of the power of alienation, but also require vesting

within the time of perpetuities, that is lives in being: If they
so hold, then they are faced with a complete dilemma.

Of course, an option to purchase does create a contingent,
equitable interest in property, which may not vest within the
period of perpetuities, that is lives in being. Indeed, an option
for one day may not cause that interest to vest within the
period of perpetuities, because, of course, mathematically,
everybody in the world can die within that one day. That is
mathematically possible. You are faced with a complete
dilemma of either declaring all options valid, because the rule
doesn't apply to them, or all options invalid unless you have
the peculiar situation where some very cautious fellow has
limited his thirty-day option to the lives of A, B and C. That
option would be good, but the ordinary option which is limited
only upon a period of days, months or years, must necessarily
fall.
Well, faced with that dilemma which the New York courts
did face, the New York courts, of course, had no difficulty in
deciding which horn of the dilemma they would be impaled
upon.2 8 The New York courts have held that the statute
does not apply. In New York there is no restriction on the
holding of options. An option can be created to last in perpetuity and be perfectly valid.
Now, the Indiana state courts have not passed upon that
problem, but there is at least a dictum in the Federal case of
Todd v. Citizens Gas Company of Indianapolis,2 9 that options
in Indiana are not subject to the perpetuities law at all.
Well, as between knocking them all out and leaving them
all in, certainly that selection is better.
28 Epstein v. Werbelosky, 233 N. Y. 525, 135 N. E. 902; In Re Waterfront,
246 N. Y. 1, 157 N. E. 911.
29Todd v. Citizens Gas Company of Indianapolis, 46 Fed. 2d 866; see also
Gavit, Indiana Law of Future Interests, p. 275.
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If, in the course of discussions which may arise as to the
advisability of a change in the Indiana law, it certainly would
be worth while to consider whether it was not desirable to
make some specific provision as to the legality of options.

